Wednesday, February 01, 2012


Erdogan, 50 plus
Was der Sieg seiner Partei für die türkisch-israelischen Beziehungen und die Juden im Land bedeutet
16.06.2011 – von Julia Damianova


Atatürks Erbe: Premierminister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will die Türkei modernisieren.© Reuters
Die Türkei hat gewählt und sich entschieden: Der alte und neue Premierminister heißt Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Seine Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Aufschwung (AKP) erhielt fast die Hälfte aller Wählerstimmen, verfehlte jedoch die gewünschte Zweidrittelmehrheit, um im Alleingang eine angestrebte Verfassungsänderung durchsetzen zu können.

Für Erdogan bedeutet der Sieg die dritte aufeinanderfolgende Amtsperiode an der Spitze der Regierung in Ankara. Die 50 Prozent Unterstützung, die sich AKP bei den Wählern holen konnte, war keine große Überraschung. Seine einstmals als islamistisch geltende Partei genießt mittlerweile im Land einen liberalen Ruf. Erdogan hat es ermöglicht, dass die griechisch-orthodoxe Kirche in der Türkei ihren Besitz zurückbekommt und ihre Akademie bald wieder eröffnet. Die Kurden dürfen Radio- und Fernsehsendungen in eigener Sprache empfangen und diese zudem offiziell erlernen.

Auch für die etwa 26.000 Juden im Land sehen die Dinge besser aus, seit die AKP an der Macht ist, sagte kürzlich der Vorsitzende der Jüdischen Gemeinde Istanbul. AKP-Chef Erdogan verspricht Modernisierung – eine neue Brücke über den Bosporus ist geplant, seine Regierung bemüht sich um eine bedeutendere internationale Rolle des Landes – vor allem im Nahen Osten, wo sich die Türkei als Beispiel für andere muslimische Gesellschaften präsentiert. Das ist eine Außenpolitik, die auch dem Selbstbewusstsein der Menschen schmeichelt.

GAZAFLOTTE Aber gerade während Erdogans letzter Amtsperiode gerieten Ankaras Beziehungen zum ehemaligen engen Partner in der Region, Israel, plötzlich in eine Krise. Anlass war Jerusalems Militäroperation gegen die Gaza-Flottille vor einem Jahr. Man kann aus Erdogans Rhetorik »eine Art Antisemitismus« heraushören, sagt der türkische Politologe Emre Erdogan. Allerdings sei der Premierminister »ein pragmatischer Führer, und die AKP ist eine typische, pragmatische konservative rechte politische Bewegung«.

Dies bedeute, dass – wann immer Erdogan die Stimmen nationalistisch gesinnter Wähler brauche – er es bevorzuge, Israel zu attackieren. Außerdem glaube »die AKP-Führung wirklich an eine Verschwörung zwischen den neokonservativen Kreisen in Washington und einem Imperialismus im Lieberman-Stil seitens Israel gegen die jetzige Regierung« in Ankara. Trotzdem hege die AKP nicht generell gegen alle israelischen Regierungen Vorurteile – schließlich hat man Israels Präsidenten Schimon Peres 2007 im türkischen Parlament empfangen.

Trotz der starken Anti-Israel-Rhetorik Erdogans blühen die Wirtschaftbeziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern. Im ersten Quartal dieses Jahres ist die Türkei zum drittwichtigsten Exportmarkt für den jüdischen Staat aufgestiegen, schreibt die Finanzzeitung Globes. Das heißt, sie kommt gleich nach den USA und den Niederlanden und knapp vor Deutschland. »Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen der Türkei und Israel werden immer stärker trotz der politischen Konflikte«, bestätigt auch der Vor- sitzende der Tel Aviv & Central Israeli Chamber of Commerce, Uriel Lynn.

EXPORTE Der bilaterale Handel zwischen beiden Ländern sei um 25 Prozent zwischen 2009 und 2010 gestiegen. In diesem Jahr sind das weitere 40 Prozent, berichtet die Zeitung »Dunya«. Auf der Liste mit türkischen Exporten nach Israel seien auch Schuhe und Uniformen für die Armee.

Populismus Der Politologe Erdogan erwartet von der neuen Regierung in Ankara eine nüchterne Außenpolitik. »Ich glaube, dass die neue türkische Außenpolitik von der Suche nach Handelsbeziehungen und dem Schaffen einer Wirtschaftshegemonie in der Region angetrieben wird.«

Da aber bereits 2013 die nächsten Wahlen im Land anstehen – zunächst Regional-, dann Präsidentschaftswahlen 2014, rechnet der Wissenschaftler damit, dass türkische Politiker außenpolitische Themen weiter für populistische Zwecke zu Hause nutzen werden.


"Erstmals bestimmt die Regierung, wer die Armee führt"
INTERVIEW | 31. Juli 2011 18:01


Foto: infakto
EMRE Erdogan (40) ist Politikwissenschafter, unterrichtet Statistik an der Bilgi-Universität in Istanbul und leitet die Meinungsforschungsgruppe "infakto".

Der türkische Politologe Emre Erdogan sieht in der Bewältigung der Armeekrise einen Fortschritt für die türkische Demokratie
Erstmals habe die Regierung die Führungsfrage entschieden, sagte er Markus Bernath. Erstmals habe die Regierung die Führungsfrage entschieden, sagte er Markus Bernath.

***

Standard: Was bedeuten die Rücktritte an der Armeespitze und die anschließende Neubesetzung für die Entwicklung der türkischen Demokratie?

Erdogan: In der Türkei hat die Armee immer selbst entschieden, wen sie wohin setzt. Es war ein festgelegtes Verfahren: Wer einmal Kommandeur der Ersten Armee wurde, konnte sicher sein, dass er zwölf Jahre später Chef der gesamten Armee würde. Mit dem Putsch von 1980 ist eine ganze Generation von Militärführern ausgewählt worden. Was nun geschah, ist eine Normalisierung. Es ist praktisch das erste Mal, dass die Regierung entscheidet, wer die Armee im Land führt.

Standard: Welche Auswirkung haben mittlerweile die Verhaftungen im Zuge der Justizermittlungen zu Putschplänen auf das Verhältnis zwischen Armee und Regierung?

Erdogan: Erdogan nimmt die Ermittlungen im Ergenekon-Fall persönlich. Er ist in dieser Hinsicht sehr unnachgiebig. Einige der Generäle, die nun angeklagt sind, sollen hinter den Propaganda-Webseiten gegen die AKP stehen. Erdogan kann das alles nicht akzeptieren. Er verweigert deshalb zum Beispiel die Beförderung von General Saldiray Berk, dem Chef des Ausbildungskommandos der Landstreitkräfte.

Erdogan will, dass die Armee die Regierung anerkennt. Er weiß, dass er nicht gegen die Führung kämpfen kann, er braucht deren Unterstützung. Seine Regierung hat also eine Art Balance gefunden: Sie redet der Armee nicht in das Budget hinein, dafür will sie den Respekt des Militärs vor der gewählten Führung des Landes.

Standard: Die Armee ist nach dem schweren Angriff der PKK auf einen Soldatentrupp in Silvan Mitte Juli in der Öffentlichkeit stark kritisiert worden. Welchen Einfluss mag das auf die Rücktrittsentscheidungen der Generäle gehabt haben?

Erdogan: Der Angriff in Silvan hat eine Reihe von unbequemen Fragen aufgeworfen, das ist richtig. Die Kritik am Einsatz dort fiel mit dem Rücktritt zusammen, es ist eher ein Zufall. Wichtiger ist, sich vor Augen zu halten, was in den 1990er-Jahren dort im Südosten der Türkei geschehen ist. Die Armee regierte damals praktisch die Region, es herrschte Kriegsrecht. Die Frage heute lautet: Wer soll für den Kampf gegen die PKK verantwortlich sein? Die Armee oder die Regierung? Wenn es die Armee ist, kann sie diesen Kampf mit den Mitteln ihrer Wahl führen. Ist es aber die Regierung, dann sind die Generäle dem Verteidigungs- und dem Innenministerium gegenüber verantwortlich. Dahin müssen wir kommen.

Standard: Sehen Sie eine neue Generation demokratisch gesinnter Offiziere kommen?

Erdogan: Ich bin mir nicht sicher. Die Militärschulen stehen nicht allen offen. Junge Offiziere in der Türkei haben eher autoritäre Auffassungen - das ist mein Eindruck. Und wenn es zu Personalentscheidungen an der Spitze der Armee kommt wie jetzt, dann stehen strategische Überlegungen im Vordergrund und nicht etwa, wie tief die demokratischen Überzeugungen eines Kandidaten sind. (Markus Bernath, DER STANDARD, Printausgabe, 1.8.2011)

http://derstandard.at/1311802370604/Politologe-Erstmals-bestimmt-die-Regierung-wer-die-Armee-fuehrt

Monday, January 30, 2012


Bir çocuk değişir, Türkiye değişir!

Bir yanda küresel kriz, diğer yanda iklim değişikliği... Yoksul, zengin fark etmiyor! Krizler, her ülkeyi savurup atıyor. Yoksulluk çığ gibi büyüyor. Kaynaklar kıt. Gıda enflasyonu tırmandıkça tırmanıyor. Bu tablo dünyada siyaseti sertleştiriyor.Sosyal demokrasinin güçlü olduğu ülkelerde bile "milliyetçilik" yükseliyor. İsterAlmanya, ister Fransa, ister Türkiye fark etmiyor. Artık etnik kimliğe dayalı siyaset moda!..
Bu da, güvensizlik ve ayrışmaya yol açıyor.
Oysa birbirimize ve kurumlara karşı minimum güven olmadan, ne ekonomi, ne siyaset, ne de sosyal düzen ayakta durabilir.
Fransa'da 2012'deki seçim öncesi tartışmalar başladı. Fransız Sosyalist Partisi,"İhtimam Toplumu" adıyla yepyeni bir kavramı tartışmaya açtı. Açıkçası tüm dünya gençlerine, çocuklarına, yoksullara ihtimam göstermek gerekiyor. 
***

Bugün 23 Nisan.Atatürk çocuklarımıza güzel bir bayram hediye etti. Bugüne kadar ülkeyi yöneten siyasetçiler, nedense en büyük sermayemiz olan çocuklarımızı hep unuttu!
Yıllardır, "çocuk işçiler" sorununu görmüyoruz. Çocuk haklarında sınıfta kaldık.Etnik kimliğe dayalı dışlanmayı yok saydık. Yoksulların çocuklarınınyoksulluğunu engelleyecek hiçbir karar almadık.
En önemlisi de, çocuğun kendisini nasıl hissettiğini hiç mi hiç merak etmedik. Kadın cinayetleriyle öksüz kalan çocuklarımızın sayısı da giderek artıyor.
Ancak çocukları düşünenler var.
Dr. Emre Erdoğan bunlardan biri.
Bilgi Üniversitesi'nde ders veriyor, İnfakto'da alan araştırmaları yapıyor. Daha önce, "Gönüllülük" ve "Sosyal Sermaye" üzerine araştırma yaptığı Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı'na (TEGV) bu kez sosyal etki analizi hazırlamış. Tablo ilginç.
Sonuç şu: TEGV'ye daha çok yoksul, mülteci ve çocuk işçiler geliyor. Daha mutlu oluyorlar, dersleri daha iyi ve kendilerine güveniyorlar. 
***
Çalışma, geçen yıl mayısta yapılmış. 10 TEGV etkinlik noktasında, çevresinde, 256 TEGV çocuğu, 183 eşdeğer çocuk ve aileleriyle, ayrıca 100 TEGV mezunuyla yüz yüze görüşülmüş.
Çok önemli bir toplumsal sorunla ilgili farklılaşma dikkat çekmiş.
Biz, birbirimize hiç güvenmez, "Babana bile güvenme" diye herkese öğütleriz. Zaten en son 2007'de 55 ülke arasında yapılan Dünya Değerler Araştırması'na göre, birbirimize güven oranı yüzde 6.3...
Bosna'dan bile geriyiz.
İşte bu kısır döngüyü kurduğu "gönüllü" sistemiyle kendine özgü bir model yaratan TEGV aşmış. TEGV gönüllülerinde karşılıklı güven yüzde 20. TEGV çocuğa inanıyor. Diyor ki: "Bir çocuk değişir, Türkiye değişir..."
CHP 
ilk kez bir "Çocuk Raporu" açıklayacak. Umarız bu soruların yanıtı bu raporda vardır.


http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/okur/2011/04/23/bir-cocuk-degisir-turkiye-degisir

0
DESTINATION: ****

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001606

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: POLLSTERS PREDICT AKP WIN, LONG-TERM
RESENTMENT TOWARD US

REF: 06 ANKARA 4888

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Nancy McEldowney, for reasons 1.
4 (b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. A cross section of leading pollsters from
Ankara and Istanbul agreed that public opinion in Turkey
shows deep polarization, disaffection and fear about the
future. Most significantly, all agree that under today's
conditions and barring unforeseen interventions, the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) would come to power again
as a single party government. They also believe that
hostility toward the US is likely to continue even if US
policies change. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) In a recent discussion with several diverse polling
organizations, the pollsters viewed political players
slightly differently but found consensus on major points.
Metropoll's Ozer Sencar observed that political polarization
is not the result of a fundamental social conflict, but
rather a lack of real choice. Voters default to AKP and
opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) for lack of an
alternative; virtually no leaders inspire confidence. He
added that while about 20 percent of AKP supporters are
rigidly committed to the party, AKP is now approaching 40
percent in polls. This surge is due both to Erdogan's skill,
as the only leader who "offers" a bright and positive future,
and the utter lack of competition from other party leaders.
(All agreed that CHP's support is in spite of Deniz Baykal,
who is openly hated within the party). Mustafa Karaman of
POLAR contended that only Erdogan and Genc Party leader Cem
Uzan excite people. Emre Erdogan of Istanbul's Infakto
Research credited AKP's track record, particularly on health
care, for giving it a more solid footing than it had when it
swept into parliament in 2002. Ibrahim Uslu of ANAR (one of
AKP's main polling contractors) argued that AKP is not a
"conjuncture party," where the stars align briefly to send it
to the top, but rather a party that already had a solid
foundation. He stated that the top determinants of voter
preferences are one's family situation for the last five
years and expectations of the future. Political performance
is only one -- and not the most important -- factor.

3. (C) Pollsters reported that a confirmed minority --
between one-fifth and one-third of Turks -- see the AKP as a
threat to secularism. The vast majority holding this view
will vote CHP, they agreed. Far-right Nationalist Action
Party (MHP) is unlikely to win their votes because the party
has not established a clear position on hallmark "secularist"
issues like the headscarf debate. Most voters do not see a
threat from AKP, and at the same time respect the Turkish
General Staff (TGS). Indeed, the TGS may have overplayed its
hand; the public defensively backed AKP following the April
27 TGS memorandum warning of threats to the secular republic.
Emre Erdogan observed that the public resents
supragovernmental entitites that obstruct political
decisions; "lawless decisions" are unpopular. CHP also
enjoyed a boost in the wake of the memorandum and mass
rallies in major cities, but only 3-5 percentage points.

4. (C) On perceptions of the United States, one participant
joked, "If you work a bit harder, you can bring your ratings
down to zero." Frustration toward the US is almost
completely directed at the current administration and at our
Northern Iraq and PKK policies (with the exception of extreme
nationalist and extreme religious individuals, Turks in
general "have no problem with the American people").
However, participants expressed doubts as to whether public
opinion would bounce back even if these two areas were
addressed; some were skeptical that after years of anger and
frustration stemming from the Iraq war, inaction on the PKK,
"infamous maps," and the perception Turkey is being divided,
US efforts in Northern Iraq could win back Turkish hearts.

5. (C) The pollsters were cautious about predicting beyond
the immediate future; they expect the July 22 general
election to occur on time, but cautioned that pressures exist
in both directions. Emre Erdogan observed that the Supreme
Election Board is determined to keep to the planned date and
the Istanbul money elites do not want a postponement.

ANKARA 00001606 002 OF 002


Ibrahim Uslu remained concerned that -- even short of a
cross-border operation or declaration of martial law -- if
security forces determined that they could not protect the
ballot boxes, they could postpone the vote. A sense of fear
pervades in the Turkish public: fear of the AKP, the
military, the jandarma, separatism, and terrorism (Turks are
angry, not afraid, of the US). Emphasizing that one month is
a long time in Turkish politics, each predicted that, under
today's conditions at least, AKP will prevail with a
single-party government.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/

WILSON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004888 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2025 TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PINS [National Security], TU [Turkey] SUBJECT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF TURKISH POLLS REF: 2003 ANKARA 004319 Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. Summary. Turkish polls have had a tendency inaccurately to forecast the outcome of Turkish national elections because the majority of Turkish survey firms do not follow the basic requirements for conducting a scientific poll. Nevertheless, Turkish elites --- including leaders in the governing AKP --- pay close attention to the results and use them to shape their political calculations and behavior. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Turkish polls have had a tendency inaccurately to forecast the outcome of Turkish national elections. In 1999, for example, most of the Turkish polling firms correctly predicted that DSP would win the plurality of the vote, but only one polling firm correctly predicted that ultranationalist MHP would receive nearly one-fifth of the vote and become the second largest party in parliament. In 2002, most polls correctly predicted that AKP would win the plurality of the vote, but they failed to accurately forecast the size of AKP,s victory. ------------------------------------- HOW TO CONDUCT AN UNSCIENTIFIC SURVEY ------------------------------------- ¶3. (C) One reasons Turkish polling results are often unreliable is that political parties sometimes commission polls for propaganda purposes, not objective analysis. For example, Ankara mayor Gocek,s head advisor Murat Dogru (strictly protect) told POLOFF that prior to the November 2002 election, Gocek,s small Democratic Party (DP) commissioned a poll indicating that DP would receive around 20 percent of the vote and secure second place in the election. In reality, the party received less than 1 percent of the vote and Gocek later abandoned the DP to join AKP. ¶4. (C) The more fundamental problem, however, is that the majority of Turkish survey firms do not follow the basic requirements for conducting a scientific poll. For a poll to be scientific, every member of the population to be surveyed (e.g. all Turkish citizens over the age of 18) must have an equal chance of being included in the sample. ¶5. (C) The majority of Turkish firms, however, violate this basic tenet by conducting their surveys in only a handful of pre-selected (not randomly selected) provinces. Turkish firms also use a quota system to select interviewees at the block and household level that can seriously bias their results. Most Turkish polls, moreover, focus on urban-only samples and when the firms try to include rural residents they implement a methodology that simply replaces one form of error with another. ¶6. (C) Ibrahim Uslu of the Ankara Social Research Center (ANAR) and Ozer Sencar of Metropoll discussed their firms polling methodologies with POLOFFs. Uslu and Sencar told us that their firms follow a methodology prescribed by the Turkish State Statistical Institute (DIE). They also suggested that the vast majority of Turkish polling firms follow variations on the same basic methodology. (Comment: Their assertion is consistent with the fact that most of the firms have made similar bad predictions in recent elections. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) The methodology employed by most Turkish firms was devised by the DIE. There are 81 provinces in Turkey, but DIE has identified thirteen "representative" provinces across Turkey and recommends that Turkish polling firms conduct surveys in these thirteen regions. Sencer also told us that DIE had a list of twenty-five "representative" provinces which firms can use to conduct "more accurate" surveys. (Comment: The fact that the DIE created a second, "more accurate" set of provinces raises red flags regarding this whole unscientific procedure. End Comment.) According to Uslu and Sencar, DIE has conducted extensive research and concluded that these provinces are similar to neighboring provinces and can be used as proxies to represent the entire region. This step violates the basic requirement for a scientific survey, i.e. that all individuals in the population have an equal chance of being selected for the survey. (Comment: Moreover, even if these thirteen or twenty-five provinces were representative of their neighboring provinces at one point in time, migration and variations in economic development have altered their representativeness over time. End Comment.) ¶8. (C) Uslu and Sencar were unable or unwilling to explain to POLOFFs how their firms constructed a methodology randomly to select individuals within the thirteen "representative" provinces. Uslu and Sencar, moreover, told POLOFFs that their firms use a quota system to select individuals within households. ANAR,s interviewers are required to conduct interviews that satisfy a preset age, gender, past voting preference, and education quota. Metropoll uses an age and gender quota and then weights the data to correct for biases in past voting preferences. Uslu and Sencar also admitted that their standard polls only interview urban respondents, although they have also conducted rural polls. (Comment: We suspect they have no methodology at the sub-provincial level and their interviewers simply wander around the province,s capital city unscientifically conducting interviews until they fill their preset quota. End Comment.) ---------------------------- SCIENTIFIC POLLING IN TURKEY ---------------------------- ¶9. (C) There are a few firms, mostly based in Istanbul, that conduct scientific polls. For example, Infakto Research --- a firm co-founded in 2003 by Emre Erdogan, a well-trained PhD social scientist --- conducts scientific surveys. Erdogan told POLOFF that his firm,s polls use stratified random samples, face-to-face interviews, and cover both urban and rural areas. Erdogan showed us documentation that corroborated his assertion. ---------------------------- ANAR,S RELATIONSHIP WITH AKP ---------------------------- ¶10. (C) Uslu reconfirmed that ANAR (REFTEL) conducts surveys for the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). State Minister Dr. Besir Atalay, an Islamist former sociology professor and university rector (dismissed from his rectorship of Kirikkale University for pursuing Islamist policies), is the founder of ANAR and Foreign Minister Gul had an office in ANAR,s building prior to the formation of the AKP. Senior AKP leaders pay close attention to ANAR,s polls. POLOFFs have repeatedly seen notebooks with ANAR,s logo on them sitting on AKP MPs, and senior officials, desks and bookshelves. On more than one occasion, moreover, AKP leaders have read from these ANAR notebooks, quoting polling data to POLOFFs in an effort to prove a certain political point. ¶11. (C) Uslu told us that ANAR initially conducted monthly polls for AKP, but after a few years of very similar results, the party has decided to cut back to bimonthly polls. Recently, AKP has asked ANAR to conduct only quarterly polls using its normal methodology, but it has also requested that ANAR supplement this with semiannual "rural" polls. The methodology behind ANAR,s rural poll, unfortunately, is just as unscientific as its normal urban-only surveys. They use ten of the same thirteen "representative regions" and they simply replace Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul with neighboring provinces. They then apply the same methodology, but require their interviewers to fill their quotas outside the boundaries of the provincial capitals. --------------------------------- TURKISH ELTIES AND PUBLIC OPINION --------------------------------- ¶12. (C) As elites do in other countries, Turkish elites appear to pay significant attention to public opinion polls. In addition to AKP, POLOFFs have been in meetings with ANAP, DSP, DYP, MHP, and SHP leaders who refer to public opinion polls when discussing public policies and political strategies. Journalists and newspaper columnists regularly refer to public opinion polls in their articles. Moreover, Turkish civil society organizations, like the pro-EU ARI Movement and the Liberal Thinking Association (LDT), have commissioned public opinion polls. ¶13. (C) Turkish political elites do not blindly follow the results of public opinion polls. Instead, they use polling results to help them judge the relative popularity (influence) of political leader; to estimate their party's prospects for electoral success; to inform the development of their political strategy and set a policy agenda; and to gauge how well they are marketing their party and policy positions. --------------------------------------------- ---- WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM TURKEY,S POLLING COMMUNITY --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶14. (C) Comment. AKP,s decision to cut back on the number of polls suggests that they are unlikely to call for early elections anytime soon: it would be odd to reduce polling efforts prior to an election. However, AKP,S decision to add two "rural" polls each year suggests that AKP is starting to worry about the level of its support in rural Anatolian farming communities. ¶15. (C) Comment, continued. AKP,s continued patronage of ANAR despite the obvious errors in ANAR,s methodology reveals a lack of expertise or inclination to carefully monitor how ANAR is doing its work. This is disturbing because we know that AKP,s leaders pay close attention to ANAR,s poll results. Moreover, this is part of a larger pattern plaguing AKP in a variety of technical fields besides polling. AKP,s leadership lacks the time, energy, ability, technical know-how, or inclination to engage in rigorous analysis of the advice it receives from its friends and so-called experts. ¶16. (C) Comment, continued. The poor state of the Turkish polling community is also illustrative of larger problems within Turkish society, e.g. 1) an over reliance and acceptance of state-directed solutions to complex scientific problems and 2) a desire to cut corners by replacing a tried-and-true method with a cheap, quick, and easy alternative. ¶17. (C) Comment, continued. Until more Turkish firms follow Infakto,s example and conduct scientific surveys, readers of Turkish polls should be skeptical of the results. Nonetheless, Turkish polling results can be useful if interpreted with an extra degree of caution. At a minimum, these polls are important because many Turkish politicians, academics, journalists, and other elites pay close attention to the results. End Comment. MCELDOWNEY


http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05ANKARA4888

YUSUF KANLI Yusuf-Kanli

Polls in the country of rabbits

HDN | 5/30/2011 12:00:00 AM | YUSUF KANLI
With opinion poll companies predicting wildly different numbers in terms of voter support for Turkey's political parties, it is anyone's guess as to the outcome of the June 12 polls.
Less than two weeks before the June 12 parliamentary elections, there is a glossy public opinion poll on my desk. Like many people, I do have an allergy against public opinion polls because of the bad reputation that whoever pays for them is presented with the results that would most please them. Of course that does not mean all the public opinion polls are crooked or faulty. Definitely there are companies in Turkey doing public opinion polls through scientific means and indeed objectively.
Another problem is, of course, the sudden increase in the number of eligible registered voters. This issue, which somehow escaped attention of all of us, was brought to the forefront by Bülent Tanla, a former politician and a pioneer of public opinion polls in Turkey. Only last year at the Sept. 12 referendum, the number of eligible registered voters was around 49 million and in 2007 it was 42 million and in 2002 it was 41.4 million. In 2010 and 2011, it all of a sudden reached 49 and 52 million, respectively. How? Are Turks multiplying like rabbits? Particularly, how have Turks multiplied by three additional million since September 2010, resulting in the number of eligible voters increasing from 49 million to 52 million? What has happened? Or, has someone placed in his pocket in advance some 10 percent of the vote in case of any emergency? It smells bad, does it not?
My problem with the public opinion polls is that so far I could not come up with a public opinion research company in this country who successfully and accurately forecasted three consecutive general or local elections. For every election there is generally a public opinion company, which came very close in its reports to the actual outcome of the poll. And, of course there is nothing surprising in that as there are companies suggesting that the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, will have an electoral support as low as 36 percent in the June 12 election, while there are companies claiming the ruling party will do very well and get support of some 52 percent of the electorate. If the AKP receives between 35 and 54 percent of the vote, then there will be companies declaring victory and celebrating their accurate forecast on the June 12 evening. For God sake, there is almost 20 percentage points between the lowest and the highest forecasts, how scientific can such forecasts be?
Or, the main opposition Republican People’s Party, or CHP, is tipped to receive around as low as 23 percent and as high as 35 percent in various public opinion polls. The fluctuation between the lowest and the highest forecasts as regards the CHP vote, thank God, is a “more reasonable” 12 percentage points.
Well, if in this country there are 52 million registered voters, every single percentage point of support for a party means around 520,000 votes cast for that party. How popular support for a political party fluctuates, if we take the estimates for AKP vote as an example, with a margin of almost 10 million people. Or we are to take the estimations for the CHP vote, the main opposition party may at least get vote of some 12 million people, but may as well receive the support of 18 million people. These companies must have been joking with the intellect of the Turkish society. With such huge margins, of course at least one company will have the probability of declaring success once the vote count is completed on June 12 evening.
The poll on my desk is somewhat different from other public opinion polls as it was not sponsored by any Turkish political party. It was done for the International Republican Institute by the Infakto Research Workshop in collaboration with Harris Interactive.
According to the poll, the AKP has popular support of around 40 percent while the support for the main opposition CHP is around 21 percent, or just slightly more than the half of the support for the AKP. The Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, which for the past few weeks has been battling to save its reputation from a series of sex-tape scandals, appears to have the support of just 10 percent of the respondents of the poll, just enough to beat the anti-democratic 10 percent national electoral threshold required to be considered eligible to send deputies to parliament.
The Peace and Democracy Party, or BDP, or the political wing of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, terrorist gang, comes next in the popularity list with 5 percent support. The BDP, anyhow, like what it did in 2007 elections, is not participating in the June 12 elections as a political party either. Instead it is participating in the election with a foray of independent candidates seeking election to Parliament from many southeastern, mainly Kurdish-populated, cities as well as some other cities elsewhere in the country, including Istanbul. Last time the independents supported by the political wing of the PKK produced 23 deputies. In this election their target is to send Parliament at least 35 deputies and many political analysts believe they have the probability of winning at least 30 parliamentary seats.
The IRI poll was conducted in the second half of April, before the series of sex-tapes scandals, which killed the political prospects of some 10 leading candidates of the nationalist MHP. Thus neither probable image erosion, nor a possible backlash in the form of boost in the electoral support of the party could be seen in those forecasts.
Yet, since the IRI poll did not distribute the around 23 percent “undecided” or “did not know” vote to the parties, it might be said, according to this poll, the AKP vote might be around 45 percent, the CHP vote around 26 percent and the MHP with a clear 12-13 percent, which would put them over the threshold.
As they say for fortune tellers, don’t believe it, but it is nice having it.